European elections 2019: How the big swindle began
The European elections were supposed to bring a big leap forward for democracy – and turned out to be a big hoax. How did this happen?
How could this debacle happen? Why didn’t Manfred Weber (CSU) and the other top candidates prevail? And this despite the good preparation – with an internal primary election at the EPP and a coronation party conference in Helsinki, which was also attended by Chancellor Angela Merkel?
To explain this, we need to “rewind” a bit. This is what we wrote back in February 2017:
Almost at the same hour as the new GroKo (in Berlin) was sealed, the CDU and CSU voted in the European Parliament in Strasbourg against the introduction of European electoral lists – and thus against the SPD and the Greens. The progressive, federalist wing of the European Parliament wanted at least a small proportion of MEPs to be elected to EU-wide lists. (…) But this does not fit into the conservative world view of CDU/CSU. Instead of daring a little more democracy, even “convinced Europeans” like E. Brok have conducted a campaign against Europe-wide lists.
Source: Eine Niederlage für Macron (und die Demokratie) – Lost in EUrope
Exactly the same party family that was committed to “democratisation” in the 2019 European elections – the CDU/CSU/EPP – has prevented the reform that was the basis for more democracy in the EU.
So far, so well known. Today – far too late – even Weber (CSU) and Ursula von der Leyen (CDU) are in favor of pan-European lists. Maybe they will come after all – for the next election in 2024?
Less well known is the domestic political background to the 2019 election bankruptcy. To understand it, we must look back again – to the summer of 2018, when a power struggle raged between Merkel and Interior Minister Horst Seehofer.
It could only be resolved with effort and many dislocations. But just at the moment when the waves had calmed down to some extent, Weber knocked on the Chancellery’s door – with a big request.
The CSU politician wanted to know whether Merkel would support his candidacy for the European elections – and if so, under what conditions. Earlier, EPP leader Joseph Daul had already antichambrized the Chancellor.
Merkel wanted to secure the peace with the CSU
Merkel was not enthusiastic, but did not say no either, because that would have triggered a new crisis with the CSU. So she informed Weber of her reservations about the “system” of top candidates – and let it go.
However, she also made it clear that Weber had to fight alone, he could not count on her help. It was a bad compromise, as we know today. Without Merkel Weber could not win.
But six months before the European elections, the Chancellor was able to secure peace with the CSU. At the same time she kept all options open for the European elections – without having to commit herself…
CONCLUSION: The election debacle began with tactical games by the CDU and CSU. The fact that CSU man Weber was the top candidate – and no one better was sought – has little to do with EUrope and a lot with German domestic politics.
This blogpost opened a series of articles on the European election 2019, part 2 is here (in German)
Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator
kwasir
4. August 2019 @ 18:26
The roots of EPP’s EP 19 debacle are less in Germany than in France where the conservative Sarkozy wing Republicans lost their fight against Macron with a loss of 50 % (!) of their seats in the European Parliament (from 16 down to 8). Weber (member of the right wing anti-immigration CSU in Germany) was the favoured candidate of the conservatives in the Republican party, divided in moderate rather pro EU integration members (positions close to Macron) and the right wing with little enthousiasm for more, but rather less integration, less immigration, more security (close to Fidesz). The president of the EPP, Joseph Daul (Gaullist, right wing Republican) pushed for Weber’s candidature well before CDU/CSU reached a new modus vivendi in Germany. The Scandinavian EPP members belong to the more moderates fraction, with positions closer to Macrons ideas about EU’s future. But their candidate, the Finn Alexander Stubb, highly qualified for the post of Commission president, had no change to win against Weber and withdrew his candidature. He would have been acceptable to the majority of the EU 28 as well as of the EP. Weber, the candidate mounted against Macron, was nominated. Therefore : no surprise that Macron (and others less eurosceptics of the 28) opposed Weber. Tactical games between CDU – CSU were of little importance of this mismatch. Much more importanat were the fear of the Republicans (and CSU !) to loose power by an important shift of votes to the extreme right (notably RN in France and AFD in Germany).
ebo
4. August 2019 @ 18:52
Interesting theory, but without Merkels “go”, Daul and Weber would not have been able to launch the process. Merkel could have chosen Von der Leyen right away. But this would have triggered a new conflict with the CSU (not with the EPP and Daul, as VdL belongs to the “family”).
Kwasir
5. August 2019 @ 10:38
VdL was not at all on the screen of Merkel who belongs rather to the moderately integration-friendly camp of the conservatives. Merkel could have lived quite well (even better) with a non German Commission chief given the already heavy DE presence in EU institutions. The anti-chambering lead by Daul in favour of Weber started well before the Maaßen CDU-CSU dispute. What else than a ‘go’ could Merkel issue ? Her nodding was without the slightest enthousiasm. Consequently she then gave only a half heartedly, minimum support Webers campaign. Merkel just wanted to avoid another row with Seehofer and other anti-migration protagonists in the C-family.This was relatively easy as she knew that Macron would eventually succeed in blocking Weber. The EPP does not need the votes of the DE CDU/CSU for suitable majority results.It is just opportun to
Kleopatra
5. August 2019 @ 08:24
Actually, Stubb did not withdraw, but stood in an EPP election for candidacy against Weber and lost by a high margin.
The fact that Weber does not master French would alone have sufficed for France not to accept him, so it did not make much sense to nominate him anyway. What is interesting is why this does not seem to have occurred to the French president of EPP, Joseph Gaul.
Kwasir
5. August 2019 @ 10:17
Right, Weber got 79 % of the Helsinki votes which reflects quite well the political weight of the center-right representatives of the EPP fraction.
What I rather meant is that when Stubb realised that he is out of the race, he withdrew from real campaigning. This is also shown by his speech to support his candidature at the EPP congress in Helsinki: nice, full of common statements, a speech more of the Weber style than of a real competitor.
Joseph Gaul is too clever for not having noticed Weber’s language handicap. An argument more to see in the ‚left‘ – ‚right‘ wing conflict among the French Republicans, brought up to the EPP level where the same tensions exist (more integration prone Northern vs. more subsidiarity oriented Eastern- Southern parties of the EPP ‚family‘) the deeper roots of the EPP-Weber debacle. This reflects the typical EU diversity also in the not all homogenous political ‚fractions‘ of the EP where members of the S&D could easily feel at home among the EPP ‚leftists‘ and vice versa.
The election results shows this EU wide divide between ‚future orientedness‘ and ‚conserving more nation based values‘ of the past. This applies also to the S&D family at EU and of course national level (well known to you from AT).